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Introduction
A couple of years ago, I received an e-mail from good long-time friends 
whom I met twenty years ago when I was a student at All Nations Chris-
tian College in England. They belong to a Protestant church and live in 
Scotland. Followig is their letter quoted with some abridgments.
Our church life is very hectic at the moment. At 62 and 65, Keith and I 
are the youngest church members apart from one couple. . . . Keith has 
a very heavy workload as a deacon, secretary, treasurer, webmaster, 
computer operator in services, guitarist, [and] the list just goes on. . . . 
When my Grandfather died, it was said that they needed 12 people 
to do the work he did, and within a very short while of him dying, 
the church closed as no one else could take on what Granddad did. 
I fear it would be the same with us if Keith dies before more young 
folk come to the church and get involved. We have no youth work 
at church as we have no youth. . . . [W]e are a church of old people. 
We desperately need some young blood but at the moment, none is 
forthcoming. It isn’t helped by the fact that we have one group within 
our church that do all they can to keep it as it was in the 1950s. No 
youngster wants to come to the sort of service they fight for, and it 
makes life very difficult. They have already forced 2 ministers to go as 
they are such dominant characters, and all they do is hold the church 
back. (Dec 15, 2011)
After I read that letter, I realized that much of it describes my own 
church in Russia today. As a fourth-generation Seventh-day Adventist, I 
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have always known my church to be vibrant, full of young people, and a 
creative community. I cannot remember a single congregation I belonged 
to or pastored that did not have a good group of young people, young 
couples, children, and teenagers. Even during the late Soviet era, the local 
Adventist churches I knew, visited, and was associated with, with rare ex-
ceptions, were full of young people. The mass evangelism of the 1990s cre-
ated a church that was even younger than what it was like in the Soviet era. 
This was in the past, however, and today the picture of the Adventist 
Church in Russia is quite different. The church I knew was a community 
of young people, but that is no longer the case. Looking at the make-up of 
today’s churches in all four of Russia’s unions in the Euro-Asia Division, I 
see more and more graying heads and many gloomy faces.
In order to illustrate what is happening, some statistics will be looked 
at first, then some interpretations will be discussed before drawing con-
clusions. In this article I am not trying to blame anybody, but rather at-
tempting to offer help so the Adventist Church can reverse the process of 
a slow death. 
Demographics Picture of Russia
It is self-evident that the church as a smaller social body is affected by 
the larger society. The church, however, has a responsibility for society 
(Niebuhr 1946). The gospel invitation is to be given to all (White 1974:102). 
To understand the social conditions in which Russian Adventists live and 
minister today, it is important to look at the major social changes Russia 
has gone through during the last two decades or so. This is important for 
navigating future mission initiatives of the Seventh-day Adventist Church 
in Russia. The more sensitive the Church is to its social environment, the 
closer it follows the Master who said, “Love your neighbor as yourself” 
(Luke 10:27).
The following charts demonstrate several major demographic trends 
that developed during the 20th century and accelerated at the beginning 
of 21st century in Russia. First, by taking a closer look at the larger demo-
graphic picture of Russia one is able to come to a better understanding 
of the social dynamics which led up to the disappearance of the USSR in 
1991and the collapse of the political, economic, and institutional systems 
soon after that. Second, the charts help the readers to understand how the 
social context in the Russian Federation affects the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church’s age and gender make-up. The charts will also help us to foresee 
how the social body of Russia will develop in the decades to come and 
therefore what the Adventist Church in Russia can expect in the future.
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Figure 1. Population of Russian Federation (in million)  Source: Gorshkov and Shereghi 
2010:16. 
As figure 1 shows, the population of Russia reached its low point in 
1946 shortly after the end of World War II, but reached its high in 1992, the 
first year after the collapse of the USSR. It is expected that the population 
will decrease by 2026 when it is predicted that the population will be 137.1 
million, close to the population in 1979.
Figure 2. Increase (decrease) in population of Russian Federation (in million).
Source: Gorshkov and Shereghi 2010:17.
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If figure 2 data is compared with historical events, Russia’s 
demographic processes were heavily influenced by social catastrophes 
which “repeatedly broke the long-term patterns of populations change” 
(Zakharov and Ivanova 1994; cf. Prokhorov 1998; Glotov 2012:36-46). In 
1992, for the first time since WWII, the number of deaths in Russia exceeded 
the number of births, and with the exception of 1995, that trend has 
continued ever since. Deaths were higher than births by almost a million 
people in 1994-1995 and in 1999-2003. The birth rate dropped sharply in 
periods of economic crises in 1962-1969 and 1992-1999. The collapse of 
the USSR, followed by drastic economic reforms triggered demographic 
disasters. For the first time in its millennial history, Russia was labeled a 
“disappearing” country (Rudenko 2007). As Eberstadt observes, over the 
two decades since the Soviet collapse, “the country’s population has been 
shrinking, its mortality levels are nothing short of catastrophic, and its 
human resources appear to be dangerously eroding” (2011:95).
Eberstadt explains Russia’s gruesome deterioration as follows:
Although the country’s problems with infectious diseases―most 
alarming HIV/AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis―are well-
known, they account for only a small fraction of the awful gap be-
tween Western and Russian survival rates. Most immediately, the 
country’s fateful leap backward in health and survival prospects is 
due to an explosion in deaths from cardiovascular disease and inju-
ries [which] account for the overwhelming majority of Russia’s spike 
in mortality levels from those of Western countries. At the moment, 
death rates from cardiovascular disease are more than three times as 
high in Russia as in Western Europe, and Russian death rates from 
injury and violence have been stratospheric, on par with those in Afri-
can post-conflict societies, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone (2011:98).
In 2005, the Russian government launched a new demographic initia-
tive which was entrusted to Dmitriy Medvedev, who was at that time the 
Vice Prime Minister in charge of national projects and priorities (Latsa 
2012). The idea behind this initiative was to boost the country’s birth rate 
and lower mortality rates. Starting on January 1, 2007 the government be-
gan paying maternity capital (family subsidies for mothers of more than 
one child, if the second child and any further children come after Janu-
ary 1, 2007). In 2007, the amount of the lump sum allowance was 250,000 
rubles (about $6,820) for the second child and any additional children and 
was indexed against inflation, reaching 429,408 rubles (about $11,720) in 
2014 (Pension Fund of the Russian Federation 2014). 
This however did not reverse the demographic situation, and as of 2012, 
the death rate was still higher than the birth rate (Federal State Statistics 
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Service 2013). Only in 2013, for the first time in the last two decades did the 
population increase from January to November 2013. Within 11 months, 
there were 1,743,300 births which is 22,700 more than the number of those 
who died (Ministry of Labor and Social Protection Report 2013).
Figure 3. Difference between births and deaths in number of population in Russian 
Federation (in thousands).  Source: Gorshkov and Shereghi 2010:18.
According to statistical predictions, starting from 2008 the percentage 
of the population that crossed the line of the “able-bodied age” (retire-
ment) will double, from 21% to 42% in 2050 (Osipov and Rybakovsky 
2009:250). This means that the burden to support elderly people will in-
evitably increase taxes on the younger generations, and the rising life ex-
pectancy in Russia will make this burden even heavier and worsen the 
pension crisis (Putin 2007:7).
Figure 4. The median age of population in Russian Federation (in years).  Source: 
Gorshkov and Shereghi 2010:19.
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It is also important to understand that the decrease in the number of 
young people in the population is not an independent process but a part 
of the larger depopulation of Russia in general (Semenova, Tvanova, and 
Dabrouina 2005:318-361). Russian society shares in the “global aging” phe-
nomenon, a phenomenon indicating “a fundamental demographic shift 
with no parallel in the history of humanity” (Jackson and Howe 2008:3). 
The median age in Russia will rise by almost two days every week, from 
38.7 years in 2011 to 42.4 years in 2025. Accordingly, Russians who are 65 
and older will make up almost 19% of the population in 2025, compared 
to 13% in 2011 (Eberstadt 2011:102). Within eight years, from 2013 to 2021, 
the number of young people aged 14-30 will decrease by about 8 million 
(see fig. 5), which is over a half of the population of Moscow.
Figure 5. The number of population aged 14-30 in the Russian Federation and prognosis 
until 2021 (in million).  Source: Gorshkov 2010:15.
Against this background of the Russian demographic picture, I next 
look at the growth rate of the Adventist Church in Euro-Asia, primar-
ily in four Russia-based unions, the West Russia Union Conference, the 
East Russia Union Mission, the Caucasus Union Mission, and the Far East 
Union Mission of Churches.
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Figure 6. Euro-Asia Division of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists.
Source: General Conference of the Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statis-
tics, and Research 2017.
Demographic Developments of the 
Adventist Church in Euro-Asia
First, I will look at the Euro-Asia Division membership growth rate 
from 1991 to 2013. As someone who was born in the Soviet Union and who 
grew up being a Seventh-day Adventist, I never heard any preaching in 
the church that envisioned the collapse of Marxism-Leninism and the dis-
appearance of its grand political creation, the USSR. Neither did I hear this 
topic mentioned in any private conversations, nor did I ever see anything 
from the Bible or the writings of Ellen G. White applied in any way to even 
hint that one day soon the mega-project of Communism would collapse 
without a single shot being fired. However, this was exactly what hap-
pened in 1991 when in a twinkle of an eye many people in the USSR and 
its satellite partners encountered a dire reality, utter misery, and existen-
tial emptiness. To use a well-known image from Jesus’ parable that I used 
in another publication “the rags and dirt on the body of the prodigal son 
[is] a picture of post-Marxist Russia” (Drumi 2008:164). It is against this 
background that one needs to interpret the rapid growth of the Seventh-
day Adventist Church during the early post-Soviet years (see fig. 7).
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Figure 7. Church membership growth in ESD, 1991-2012.  Source: General Conference of 
Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research 2014. 
Figure 8. ESD growth rate, 2005-2015.  Source: General Conference of Seventh-day Ad-
ventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research 2017.
What was the main reason for the rapid if not phenomenal church 
growth among Seventh-day Adventists in Russia in those days? By the 
1980s, the growing inadequacy of the Russian version of the Marxist ideo-
logical paradigm became evident to the political elite led by then presi-
dent Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. Many of the reforms that were initi-
ated during the period of perestroika resulted eventually in the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. Not surprisingly, two surveys done in Russia 
in 1990 and 1991 demonstrate that the “rapid growth of religiosity and 
just as rapid ruin of mass atheism” went hand in hand in Russia (Furman 
1992:7).
However, to say that religious faiths replaced atheism would be an ex-
aggeration. The disillusionment with Marxism-Leninism did not lead the 
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masses to embrace an actual practicing of religion (Shterin 1998). It is also 
true that from around 1997, interest in a religious life began a steady de-
cline. In the first half of the 1990s, the rate of church attendance across the 
Russian Federation was no more than 6-7 percent of those who claimed 
to be believers (Kaariainen and Furman 1997:36-38). The worldview of 
Russians did not suddenly become “religious,” “Christian” or “biblical.” 
Rather, it became more eclectic and controversial, allowing old atheistic 
clichés to coexist with the emerging new patterns of thought (38).
During that same period when the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) 
was gradually filling an ideological niche, the conditions for non-Ortho-
dox denominations to operate in Russia worsened. The Russian govern-
ment reaction to the supposed threats from foreign sects and various isms 
led to the development of protectionist ideologies (Balmforth 2011). The 
dominant role of the ROC was legitimized when Russian president Bo-
ris Yeltsin in September 1997 signed legislation that recognized only the 
Russian Orthodox Church, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism as “traditional 
religions” (System Garant 2013). Later amendments to that legislation 
introduced between 1997 and 2013 further narrowed opportunities for 
conventional methods of evangelism used by “non-traditional” religions, 
particularly Protestant ones. The amendments reflect a strong move by 
the government toward implementation of the “spiritual security” policy 
as an important subset of the national security concept of Russia (Elkner 
2005).
Taking a closer look at figure 7 it appears that the excitement created 
through public evangelism―that the world is coming to its end―lasted 
probably only 10-11years (from 1991-2003). The sudden increase in church 
growth slowed after reaching its peak in 2003, a downward trend that 
continues to this day. In the years that followed the collapse of the Soviet 
system, mass evangelistic campaigns had been initially well received and 
resulted in rapid church growth with most of that growth experienced in 
regional and district cities. By the end of 2003, the church membership in 
the Euro-Asia Division reached its highest point, increasing from 37,388 
in 1990 to 144,760 (in the Russian Federation, from 8,666 to 45,000). In the 
late Soviet years, the majority of Soviet Adventists lived in the Ukraine 
and Moldova.
The tide started to turn in 2003 with a steady decrease in member-
ship since that time. By the end of 2013, the membership of the ESD to-
taled 117,028. If compared with 2003, there was a drop of 27,732 or over 
20 percent. Moreover, according to the ESD Secretary’s Statistical Report 
Analysis, from 1990 to 2011 the Adventist Church baptized 293,131 people 
(ESD SSRA 2013a:3). However, during that same period the Church also 
witnessed a great loss of members (as listed below).
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Several things stand out as one looks at those numbers. First, the rea-
sons for the large number of dropped/apostatized/missed members has 
not been analyzed in a comprehensive way. To the best of my knowledge, 
no in-depth study has been done in the ESD as to why so many people left 
the church between 1990 and 2011. The two international surveys among 
former and inactive church members conducted under the leadership 
of the General Conference Nurture and Retention Committee from 2011 
through 2013 (Sahlin 2013; Kent 2013) did not shed any light on the spe-
cific situation in the Euro-Asia Division.
Nevertheless, two indicators from the survey conducted by Monty 
Sahlin might provide keys to better understanding the situation regarding 
dropouts in the Euro-Asia Division. First, he points out that 66 percent of 
those who left the Adventist Church were people from 18-29 years of age 
(37%) and 30-39 years of age (29%). Most of them were within the category 
of “youth.” Second, 83 percent of those who left the church had never at-
tended an Adventist school (Sahlin 2013). It seems that there is some corre-
lation between these two findings. It may well be that the greatest failure 
of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Euro-Asia in the 1990s and early 
2000s was a lack of appreciation of the importance and missional value of 
Adventist education as a long-term mission strategy. Hardly anybody in 
those days could foresee that the Russian government would change its 
attitude toward private (religious) schools (that is, kindergarten to 11th 
grade). Starting from September 2012 onward the government started to 
provide considerable financial support to private schools.
For example, during the 2013-2014 school year, the government subsi-
dy of Zaoksky Christian School of the General Education (an Adventist school 
operated by Zaoksky Theological Seminary) amounted to 40 percent of 
the school operating budget (Bychkov 2014). Unfortunately, there are 
presently only two Adventist schools in the territory of the Russian Fed-
eration eligible to claim such benefits from the government—the one in 
Zaoksky and another in Tula. Had there been more schools established 
in the 1990s and early 2000s, and had there been a strategic focus on Ad-
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ventist education for children rather than focusing only on new baptisms, 
today’s statistics would most likely be different.
Second, the number of those who died is close to 40,000, or an annual 
rate of about two percent of the total church membership. This means that 
the death rate within the Adventist Church has been twice as high as that 
of the general population in Russia (see fig. 3). In other words, this index 
indicates that the age of church members is older than that of society in 
general.
Third, there is a steady emigration of Adventists into other countries 
outside the Euro-Asia Division, mostly to North America and the Euro-
pean Union. From 1990 to 2011, 13,535 transferred their membership to 
other countries. The sad thing about this emigration is that among those 
who left the division were a number of key intellectuals and pastors. This 
“brain-drain” has hurt the church because it has not been able to regain 
the intellectual capital it used to have.
Because of the above factors, between the 2005 and 2010 General 
Conference sessions the church leadership in the ESD launched an all-
ESD program of reclaiming church members. As part of its “Come Back 
Home” initiative the Church emphasized pastoral visitations and the es-
tablishment of friendly relationships. After the first stage was completed 
in 2013, the Church was able to reclaim 2,913 church members but un-
fortunately 16,569 members withdrew their membership (Euro-Asia Divi-
sion 2013a:8-9, 13).
Two more things need to be pointed out in this context. As figure 7 
shows, the turning point from good to poor church growth coincided with 
the decline of the youth population in Russia (fig. 5). Second, the begin-
ning of the declining membership trend coincided with the downward 
enrollment trend at Zaoksky Adventist Seminary and Institute (fig. 8), 
an educational institution run by the Euro-Asia Division since 1988. As 
can be seen from figure 9, starting from the 2003/04 school year when the 
number of on-campus bachelor students in the Zaoksky Adventist Semi-
nary and Institute was the highest—close to 300 students—from that point 
on there has been a clear downward trend. The negative trend has not 
been reversed in spite of unprecedented financial support provided to the 
institution by the Euro-Asia Division in the way of scholarships. Unlike 
the 1990s when there were large numbers of young people eager to get a 
Christian education and when many of them were short of money, today 
it is just the opposite. There is money available but a significant lack of 
young people willing to use it to take programs offered on the campus of 
Zaoksky.
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Figure 9. Enrollment trend (Bachelor, on-campus programs) in Zaoksky Adventist Semi-
nary and Institute (ZASI).  Source: Zaoksky Adventist Seminary and Institute, Enrollment 
Office Report 2013.
One of the questions that needs to be asked is What went wrong? Did 
the church do anything wrong or what happened in society? To answer 
the above questions I would say that probably things have changed both 
within the Church and in society. As more Russians experienced exposure 
to material affluence and a lifestyle of a developed country, consumerism 
became the new ideology of Russia. As Golova points out, an entrenchment 
of consumerism through a system of control over consumerist behavior 
has led to an internalizing of “the values of the consumerist society and 
[the] creating [of] a new formation: an active and manageable consumer” 
(Golova 2011:91). As she concludes, the “inertia of our culture has been 
broken, and the Russian nation is now oriented to consumption” (102).
As Russia entered the orbit of capitalism and unrestricted wealth, it 
had two effects on the country’s population. Besides improving the eco-
nomic conditions of the population, it caused people to idolize wealth. 
In light of Jesus’s remark that it is the pagans who fall prey to consum-
erism (Matt 6:31-33), the new lifestyle that Russians so quickly acquired 
was pagan and paganizing (Hirsch 2006:111). In Russia, the Orthodox ver-
sion of the Christian faith has been gradually re-adopted by the state as a 
new ideology, thus filling the vacuum left after the disillusionment with 
Marxism-Leninism. This new ideology, however, has deviated from such 
key values and images of the gospel as the narrow gate and the difficult 
way (Matt 7:13, 14), the need to lay up treasure in heaven and not on earth 
(Matt 6:19, 20), taking up one’s cross and following Jesus (Matt 10:38), and 
not following Caesar.
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How did these shifts affect the church? As one looks back at the devel-
opments of the 1990s and 2000s, one soon realizes that Russian Adventists 
were too slow to change and adapt to the fast changes that were taking 
place in the social, spiritual, and intellectual realms of Russian society. 
Nobody taught us that adaptation and reshaping was necessary because 
of the changing social and spiritual landscape. Too many thought that any 
change was compromise. Somehow, we came to believe that “the present 
truth” works automatically, simply because it is “the truth.” We under-
appreciated how competitive the “spiritual market” would become in a 
matter of a few years and how fast people would gain self-respect and 
critical eyes as to what to believe, which church to attend, which books to 
read, etc.
In the days of mass evangelism when a certain euphoria was imported 
by foreign evangelists, we became “number-possessed” trying to achieve 
the highest numbers of baptisms in the shortest time possible. Sadly, the 
quality of those baptisms left much to be desired, and the social body of 
the Church could not and did not “digest” the numbers of newcomers 
properly. It may have well been that the strategy of “advancing the mes-
sage” by producing new baptisms was implemented at the expense of 
growing churches that would be sound spiritually and healthy socially.
Perhaps, we as Russian Adventists relied too heavily on the quality of 
spiritual bread baked on other continents and did not dare to offer our 
own recipes to bake a bread with Russian flavors in it. The more society 
changed the more we were alienating ourselves from it, and the more for-
eign we became as a religious group of people in Russian society. By an 
extreme emphasis on the “immanent end of the world” at the expense 
of being sensitive to the social needs of the society (for instance, its deep 
need of morally sound and academically strong education for children) 
we became more “unique” but less understood by the surrounding culture.
The dominant theological reasoning of those days was keeping the truth 
rather than offering the truth. In other words, by keeping the truth we wanted 
new comers to reproduce what we did as we had kept the truth in our 
semi-underground Soviet existence. It is true that the keeping the truth 
paradigm worked perfectly well during the decades of persecutions and 
did help the church remain close to its message. The message did have a 
liberating power in the lives of the believers. Later, however when free-
dom of expression was restored, the concept of keeping the truth became an 
obstacle. As the new Russian society emerged around us, the members of 
the Church did not know how to become more sensitive to the surround-
ing culture, and thereby did not produce a more nuanced approach to 
mission in a rapidly changing society. In the hidden and sometimes open 
clashes between the old keeping the truth paradigm and the emergence 
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of the new reality, the Church made theological gains but lost missiologi-
cally. For example, at times the issue of right belief became more impor-
tant than obeying the commandment to “love your neighbor as yourself.” 
In other cases, the issue of having a strong administrative and financial 
structure was more important than following Jesus’ teaching about receiv-
ing sinners and helping them grow and become disciples. There was also 
the issue of maintaining the right interpretation of Daniel and Revelation 
to the point that it became more important than teaching about follow-
ing the Sermon on the Mount in everyday life. As a result, probably the 
greatest missiological failure was that by trying to keep the truth Adventists 
gradually developed a self-protective, semi-closed mentality and thereby 
hindered the development of an externally focused mission.
 
Youth in the Adventist Church in the Russian Federation
There are four unions of the Seventh-day Church in the Russian Federa-
tion today: the West Russian Union Conference (WRUC), the East Russian 
Union Mission (ERUM), the Caucasus Union Mission (CaUM), and the Far 
Eastern Union of Churches Mission (FEUCM) (fig. 10). With insignificant 
exceptions, the territorial borders of the four unions follow the adminis-
trative borders of the Federal Districts (FD) of Russia. WRUC includes 
Central, North-Western, Privolzhskiy, and Ural FDs; CaUM includes the 
Southern FD; ERUM includes the Siberian FD; FEUCM includes the Far 
Eastern FD. If taken together, the four Russian unions comprise about half 
of the 117,028 church membership of the Euro-Asia Division.
Figure 10. Four Russia-based unions of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.  Source: Gen-
eral Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research 
2014. 14
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Due to the numerous territorial reorganizations that took place in the 
1990s and early 2000s, the membership statistics in each of the four unions 
is somewhat fragmentary and available with varying degrees of precision. 
To track the yearly growth patterns for the same timespan as has been 
done for the Euro-Asia Division is beyond the scope of this paper. At this 
point, suffice it to say that church growth/decline in the four Russia-based 
unions reflects the dynamics seen in the Euro-Asia Division in general.
In the following section, I will first compare the number of young peo-
ple living in the territories of the Federal Districts of the Russian Federa-
tion (coinciding with the corresponding unions) to the general popula-
tion. Second, I will compare the number of baptized young people (16-30 
years of age) in each of the unions to the total membership in those unions. 
Third, I will compare the proportion of young people in all four Russia-
based unions to the proportion of young people in the Russian Federation. 
This will give a better understanding of the demographic conditions of the 
church as compared to the demographic conditions of society.
Two additional things need to be stated at the outset. First, the total 
membership in each of the unions does not coincide with the number of 
those who actually attend church on a given Sabbath, for attendance is 
lower than the membership. Take, for example, the WRUC as the largest 
(in terms of membership) among the four Russia-based unions. As of the 
fourth quarter of 2013, there were 29,361 church members. The number of 
those attending Sabbath School was 18,155 on the second Sabbath of the 
quarter and 18,661 on the seventh Sabbath of the quarter (WRUC, Sabbath 
School and Personal Ministries Department Report 2014). That means that 
roughly one-third of the official members did not attend church at all.
Second, there is a small, and I believe, acceptable statistical error in the 
following calculation. Prior to 2011, not all statistical data regarding young 
people was properly collected in the unions and it is therefore unavailable 
for comparison. Therefore, the comparison I make will be between the 
numbers of young people in the country as of 2009 and the numbers of 
young people in the four Russia-based unions as of 2012. 
Youth in Russia vs. Youth in the Russian Adventist Church
As of 2009, there were 33,009,000 young people aged 15-29 in Russia, 
which is 23.3% of the general population of the country (UNICEF 2010:9). 
The number of young people living in the four Federal Districts (FD) cov-
ered by the WRUC (including Volgograd and Astrakhan regions) was 
23,703,000 or 23.4% of the population in those Federal Districts (UNICEF 
2010:11, 12). As of 2012, the number of young people in the WRUC was 
3,614 or 12% of the membership which stood at 30,011 (Euro Asia Division 
2013b). This percent is 1.94 times less than the percent of young people in 
the population in the four Federal Districts.
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In the same manner, if similar calculations are made for each Russian-
based union in correlation to the population in their respective Federal 
District(s), it results in the following percentages of baptized young peo-
ple compared to the number of young people living in the their respective 
territories.
*with the exception of Volga and Astrakhan regions
If the data for all four Russia-based unions are summarized, the percent-
age of young people to the general membership in the four Russia-based Unions 
is less than half the percentage of young people to the general population of the 
Russian Federation.
This index should create deep concern among church leaders, pastors, 
and educators because it states that the Seventh-day Adventist Church 
in Euro-Asia is graying much faster than the Russian population in gen-
eral, a population already considered old (Jackson and Howe 2008:3). In 
Russia, the retirement age for males is 60 and for females is 55, and the 
number of people in this age category or older is 13 percent of the gen-
eral population, that is, 6 percent above the mark of 7 percent accepted as 
borderline between young and aging population. That means that every 
8th person in Russia is older than 65. Within the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church in Russia that percentage is even higher, meaning that the Church 
is an old and further aging social body within a rapidly aging Russian society.
The general statistics collected at the local church and reported to the 
higher church administrative levels are not separated by age and gender. 
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From our analysis above this would be of significance to show who is com-
ing in or leaving the church. To the best of my knowledge, the age profile 
of the church has never been analyzed in-depth and discussed publicly 
during church business meetings that I have had a privilege to attend. 
But it appears that such membership accounting would be vital for the 
planning and establishing of programs, especially to attract young people.
Socio-Theological Reflection
According to Paul, the church is Christ’s body (1 Cor 12:27). Is this a 
theological statement only or can it be interpreted sociologically as well? In 
my opinion, the latter is just as acceptable as the former. All who saw Jesus 
when he walked on this earth remembered him being a thirty-year-old 
male (Luke 3:23). Those who watched him dying on the cross remembered 
him being a thirty-three-year-old man. Other ages of Jesus in the Gospel of 
Luke mention him as a one-day and eight-day-old baby (Luke 2:7, 21) and 
as a twelve-year-old boy (Luke 2:42). As Jesus was shaping the nucleus of 
his religious movement, he surrounded himself with men and women of 
his age or close to it. Perhaps it was because of the itinerant nature of his 
mission and the demanding lifestyle that went with it. Youth seemed to be 
at the forefront of the early church mission. A good example was “a young 
man named Paul” (Acts 7:58; italics added).
The Jewish religious establishment struggled to accept Jesus who 
boldly proposed a rejuvenation of the Jewish religion as well as libera-
tion of people from spiritual decline. Religious leaders of that time criti-
cized Jesus, saying, “You are not yet fifty years old” (John 8:47). Thus, they 
showed their inability to embrace new thinking and realign the spiritual 
and theological values of their own religion. The novelty of Jesus’ teach-
ing and freedom of his behavior could not and did not fit the dead reli-
gious forms. Old wineskins could not contain new wine. This resulted in 
the death of the Messiah and the tragic historical divorce of Judaism and 
Christianity.
Although it is true that history repeats itself, it is equally true that it 
does not have to do so. As one looks beyond Paul’s metaphor and takes 
into consideration the demographic picture of Seventh-day Adventists in 
Russia, two questions come to mind. First, figuratively speaking, What hap-
pened to Jesus’ young body, that is the Church that claims to be that body? 
Second, What can be done to rejuvenate the Church’s youthful potential? 
The demographics picture of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 
Russia shows that there is a dangerous lack of “young” followers of Jesus 
in the many Adventist congregations and companies scattered throughout 
Russia. True, there is no way for the Seventh-day Adventist Church to stop 
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or reverse the “global graying” trend. Neither is it the Church’s mission. 
On the other hand, silently sitting by is not acceptable for a church eagerly 
seeking to bring the Good News of Jesus to every corner of the world. 
As time goes by and if Jesus does not return soon, Adventism in Russia 
will find itself at a critical crossroad. The options Russian Adventism has 
can be reduced to either retract or to rethink itself. The first option will 
cause Adventism to be even less flexible toward local cultural contexts 
and more vulnerable in the face of current and looming challenges. If Ad-
ventism wants to survive and be relevant in Russia it will need to become 
more aware and flexible toward the local cultural environments and less 
monolithic and homogeneous. Neither option is an easy one.
The first option will further stagnate the movement that used to be vi-
brant and appealing to the public. A rigid church will lose touch with the 
radical changes that have occurred in society during the last two decades. 
Those events have changed how people think, feel, behave, communicate, 
socialize, and who they really are, culturally, socially, economically, po-
litically, and existentially. I believe that a preoccupation with prophetic 
charts and schemes at the expense of ignoring the fast changing cultural 
and demographic landscapes in the Russian Federation has contributed to 
the shrinking of the Adventist Church in Euro-Asia.
Notice what young Russians (age 14-30) usually do in their leisure 
time:
Figure 11.  Sample of leisure activities of young Russians.  Source: Gorshkov and 
Shereghi 2010:196-197.
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One of the implications of the above picture is that religion and church, 
if presented to young people in an abstract way (as a concept, theory, or 
ideology) will not be understood by most young people, and will be even 
less appreciated and acceptable. A far better focus of the church’s mission 
would be to help people encounter God rather than the distribution of 
knowledge about Him. There is no other option for the church but to fol-
low Jesus in meeting people where they are mentally, socially, virtually, 
and even physically. 
If Adventism in Russia fails to interact in creative ways with local cul-
tural contexts and does not produce locally appreciated patterns and prac-
tices of spiritual life, its members will become poorer and poorer intellec-
tually, spiritually, and socially. The present methods of Adventist mission 
in Russian will only continue to attract people of a certain mindset, mostly 
elderly and retirees, but will close the doors for many others. “Fitting” 
in this context, is not a matter of moral choice and morality as such but a 
mental worldview picture the church generates and offers to spiritually 
thirsty people. If Adventism resists rethinking itself and prefers to keep 
reproducing itself in the exact forms and meanings of a 19th century es-
chatological movement, the church will be diminished in its relevance and 
eventually in its existence. 
The danger of having old missiological clichés in presenting a “young 
Jesus” are two mutually exclusive and incompatible things, and the soon-
er the church realizes that the better it will be in the long run. To some 
extent, the preaching of the “soon coming of Jesus” and the “three angels’ 
messages,” that is, a message about a new, otherworldly reality violently 
breaking into this world order may have also led to the decline of youth 
in the church. A message about heaven sounds appealing for people who 
have already lived their lives on earth and who do not expect much more 
in this life. The idea of the soon coming of the Kingdom of God was very 
attractive in Russia when people suffered and were persecuted, but that 
message has lost its appeal for those who have just begun to live and ma-
ture and who want to experience life in all its fullness. A message of heav-
en does not provide answers to the challenges of daily life. If the message 
continues to keep its focus on transcendent issues of highly speculative 
theology and fails to touch people where they are, the result will be no 
better than what the church is experiencing today. 
The worldview paradigm of nineteenth-century Protestant America 
into which Adventism was born and shaped, and the highly different 
worldview that Russians have created today, is so different that it is time 
to rethink and reformulate the Adventist identity and message. If Jesus 
Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever (Heb 13:8), why not try to 
understand him and his gospel anew, in Russia through Russian eyes? It 
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is vital to decode Adventism and let God’s Spirit produce locally under-
stood and appreciated religious meanings. By avoiding open conversa-
tions and honest discussions in formulating such a relevant and cultur-
ally-accepted message may result in the church becoming an obstacle in 
God’s mission instead of being its agent. 
A second option, in which Adventism rethinks itself, is by no means an 
easy task. There is no such thing as shapeless truth. Religious truth that 
remains in the forms and rituals (including verbal formulas and methods 
of theologizing) of a bygone era and people in their 70s has the poten-
tial to create conflict and misunderstanding between older and younger 
generations, between archaic and modern worldviews, between modern 
and post-modern, faith and knowledge, universal and local, Western and 
non-Western, and between propositional truths and truths hidden in nar-
ratives, etc. 
Perhaps, it would be helpful, in the context of Russian Adventism fac-
ing a demographically tough future, to introduce a concept of “emerging 
Adventism” and let it coexist with the conventional “growing Advent-
ism.” In my view, this change offers some hope that, if enough thinking, 
thoughtful discussion, theological research, and prayers are given to the 
issue, the church will be able to redefine itself and be better prepared for 
the next historic era that may last longer than we expect. 
To achieve such a goal and re-define Adventism will require that there 
be among other things, (1) a common understanding of what has gone 
wrong, (2) a genuine desire for biblically acceptable change; (3) patience 
to listen to and accept others regardless of their different views; (4) hon-
est conversation about what has become theological “sacred cows.” This 
will eventually lead to the reformatting of Adventism in a way that allows 
it be more locally sensitive and spiritually responsible for the name and 
message it bears.  
If one dares to offer some suggestions as to what needs to be done to 
help Russian Adventism face its demographic challenges, several impor-
tant steps should be taken. 
First, we urgently need to have an open, honest, and frank discussion 
about the methods and approaches the church has used over the last two 
decades of religious freedom. The wider this discussion is, the more pain-
ful the process will be. Yet the church has neither the time nor the moral 
resources to allow anything less than that. It is time to listen to local pas-
tors, elders, and church members and let them speak, as the Spirit would 
tell them to speak. This discussion, I believe, will lead to a careful analysis 
of what has gone wrong in the past and what might be a long-term strat-
egy of finding a way out. It is naïve, however, if not arrogant, to expect the 
Spirit to answer questions that we already know the answers to.
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Second, it is time to have a long-range family and child/youth policy 
in the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia for the next 20-30 years. 
Helping young Adventist parents, especially those who have many chil-
dren, to rear them in a Christian way must be considered as the mission-
ary work. This demands the heavy and systematic support by the church, 
including the use of tithe monies. From a priority, family and children/
youth work must become the priority of the church’s mission. If youth 
is not the focus, in twenty years the results will be much worse than the 
picture we see today that is itself the result of twenty years of significant 
under-appreciating the importance of these areas. 
Third, it is time to include in church statistical reports age and gender 
information of church members in the local church, mission/conference, 
union, and division. This is not something difficult to achieve, but statisti-
cally speaking, this will help present a much better understanding of the 
demographics of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia. Here is a 
sample of what can be done by the church in terms of getting more accu-
rate information about itself:
Figure 12. Age and sex structure of Russian population as of January 1, 
2012 (males left side, females right side).  Source: Federal State Statistic Service 2013.
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No doubt, if such a demographic distribution chart of the Russian 
Seventh-day Adventist Church were made today, it would provide an 
eye-opening bit of information for all levels of the church organization. 
Just numbering baptisms and charting that information has become mis-
leading and does not show the real picture. The church should take much 
more seriously the aging population of its members. If accurate statistics 
were available the church could then compare the percentage in each age 
bracket with the life expectancy charts for the various regions of Russia. 
There is another issue that should cause concern: Most of the money 
given to the church is provided by elderly people who strongly support 
the church structure, church projects, church institutions, and church 
workers. According to a survey conducted by the Ministerial Association 
of the ESD in the fall of 2011, almost 80% of the local churches have a 
membership where the number of female church members is 70% and 
higher (Euro-Asia Division 2012). The church organization and its work-
ers need to realize that they are primarily supported by one of the most 
vulnerable and often least protected social groups in Russia, namely ba-
bushkas (old women). 
Fourth, a one-size-fits-all approach to mission has completely ex-
hausted its potential. The older a person becomes, the more receptive they 
are to an eschatological message. However, the younger a person is, the 
higher the importance attached to a message of hope for life here and now. 
An eschatological message helps older people face their future encounter 
with death without fear and panic; a message of hope for the present gives 
meaning and fulfillment to life here in this world. As mentioned above, 
much of the “revival in Russia” evangelism focused on eschatological 
hope at the expense of practical, Bible-based knowledge on how to live 
this life with meaning and purpose now. 
Fifth, Russian Adventists should remember their history, particular-
ly the fact that it was the graying minds that brought their country, the 
USSR, to disaster and caused its disappearance. Gerontocracy is just as 
dangerous as immaturity in leadership. 
Finally, it is time to read anew Jesus’ parable regarding the old and 
new wineskins. Jesus said, “No one puts new wine into old wineskins; or 
else the new wine will burst the wineskins and be spilled, and the wine-
skins will be ruined. But new wine must be put into new wineskins, and 
both are preserved. And no one, having drunk old wine, immediately de-
sires new; for he says, ‘The old is better’” (Luke 5:37-39 NKJ). If this par-
able was true regarding Judaism during Jesus’ days, why would it not 
apply also to 21st century Adventism in Russia? There is no shame in ac-
knowledging the fact that in Adventism, there is both old and new wine, 
and, perhaps, there are both old and new wineskins. It is time to develop 
a locally meaningful Adventist “theology of change” that could help avert 
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the very possible grim future the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia 
will otherwise face. 
There is a great need to look at Adventist theology and decide: What 
are the key essentials that make us Adventists? Are they all equally Bi-
ble-based? How detailed should they be spelled out? In my view, these 
essentials must transcend time, culture, and history. They should not be 
too numerous, too complex, too specific, or too abstract. Yet, they must 
be spiritually profound, practically applicable, well-articulated, and well 
understood in each given time and culture. A good example of this ap-
proach is Acts 15:28, 29 where is says, “it seemed good to the Holy Spirit, 
and to us [church leaders], to lay upon you [“the brethren who are of the 
Gentiles”] no greater burden than these necessary things: that you abstain 
from things offered to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from 
sexual immorality. If you keep yourselves from these, you will do well.”
Just as the Adventist pioneers were able to extract key essentials from 
the Bible in the 19th century that shaped a new religious understanding, so 
too must the Church today be more proactive in the ongoing task of seek-
ing God and his will in and for a given culture and context. The members 
at the grassroots level of the Church must have more freedom to articu-
late what they see in the Bible, how they understand it, and how they plan 
to follow its precepts. There should be more spontaneity in theologizing 
as well as in practicing what the Bible teaches. No doubt, the theologi-
cal/doctrinal framework of the Church must be universally agreed upon. 
At the same time, within that framework there must be enough room for 
creative theological and missiological inputs from the local churches and 
their believers. 
Presently, many church members feel alienated from much of what 
takes place in their church. There is a sense of alienation from the giving 
and use of tithes and offerings, from the process of developing and elabo-
rating the church’s strategies and plans, from the process of appointing 
or moving local pastors, etc. These areas of alienation lead many church 
members to feel alienated from the church’s mission. Eventually, this 
leads to the costliest loss, the loss of ownership of mission, when people 
no longer think and feel that it is their mission and their responsibility to 
reach out and bring the gospel to all people. Without overcoming these 
and other areas of alienation, there appears little hope for significant progress 
of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Russia in the foreseeable future. 
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Conclusion
Being an international and highly diverse community of believers, the 
world-wide Seventh-day Adventists Church has always struggled with 
maintaining its identity in a fast-changing world. This is natural, and 
much credit is to be given to several generations of church leaders for suc-
cess in this regard. Nevertheless, after the seeds of Adventism have been 
liberally sown all over the world and as the seeds have grown, it is time 
to let those plants share more responsibility for their own future. Pater-
nalism and top-down strategizing is no longer adequate to facilitate the 
spiritual rejuvenation of local forms of Adventism.
To experience the refreshing power of the Spirit is clearly the work of 
God. It is time to ask him to give us courage to re-think our Adventist mes-
sage and identity both universally and locally. Otherwise, as it has been 
demonstrated in this article, the Adventist Church will keep producing 
one-sided results that simply do not have a future. This is at least true for 
Russia. If an inspiring image of a “young Jesus” emerges in the heads and 
hearts of people who claim to believe in him and who want to follow him, 
most likely the result will be an emerging Adventism, renewed in the im-
age and likeness of a “young Jesus.”
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